INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1988, the five-word sentence most feared by nonexclusive patent licensees was "Your licensor filed for bankruptcy." They should still be afraid. While most patentees 1 prefer nonexclusive licenses, 2 which provide enormous royalty profits 3 as well as the con-DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 48:571 tinued ability to use the technology and to control patent litigation, 4 patentee bankruptcy can place nonexclusive licensees in a precarious position. Prior to 1988, if a patentee-licensor filed for bankruptcy under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code 5 and was allowed to reject the license as an executory contract, 6 the licensee could no longer use the patented technology without infringing the patent. 7 This unseemly state of affairs came to a head in Lubrizol Enterprises v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. 8 In Lubrizol, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit allowed the debtor-licensor, Richmond Metal Finishers, to reject as executory its nonexclusive patent license agreement with its licensee, Lubrizol Enterprises. 9 To prevent other patent licensees from suffering fates similar to that suffered by Lubrizol, 10 Congress enacted the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1988 (IPBPA).
11 Congress intended the IPBPA to protect the debtor-licensor's right to rehabilitate while affording the patent licensee the right to continue exploiting 12 the patent without threat of infringement. 13 The IPBPA allows the debtor-licensor to reject the license, and all affirmative duties under it, while allowing the patent licensee to retain his right to use the intellectual property.
14 Congress realized that by rejecting the affirmative duties the debtor-licensor breaches the license agreement; thus, the IPBPA allows the licensee to enter a general unsecured 4 . See, e.g., Frost, supra note 3, at 734.665 (noting that General Motors would require "far greater royalty potential than is usually available to warrant the risk of being dragged into [patent infringement] litigation" by exclusive licensees). Nonexclusive licenses allow licensors to retain control over patent litigation because, unlike exclusive licensees, nonexclusive licensees do not have standing to sue for patent infringement. See discussion infra Part I.C.
5. See 11 U.S.C. § § 1101-74 (1994) . 6. See infra text accompanying notes 76-79 (explaining executory contracts and how the ability to reject them in bankruptcy may benefit the debtor).
7. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 2-3 (1988) (1994) ).
12. In the context of this Note, the term "exploiting" should not be given its usual pejorative meaning, but instead should be defined as "commercializing to the fullest extent possible."
13. See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 4-5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3203. 14. See discussion infra Part II.A.
claim against the debtor-licensor for breach of contract. 15 However, Congress failed to recognize that if the license involved is a nonexclusive patent license, rejecting the affirmative duty to defend the patent leaves the patent unprotected. While it may be true that debtorlicensors are not in a financial position to protect the patent, nonexclusive patent licensees do not have standing to protect the patent. 16 Since patents derive their value from the ability to exclude others from using the patented technology, failure to protect a patent can render the patent-as well as licenses based upon it-worthless. 17 As a result, if the Lubrizol case were decided today, the patent licensee Lubrizol would still be in a precarious position, unable to defend the licensed patent.
This Note will offer a solution to extricate nonexclusive patent licensees from this precarious position. Part I will discuss the prevalence of nonexclusive patent licenses and reasons for denying nonexclusive licensees standing to sue for patent infringement. Part II will examine the shortcomings of the IPBPA. Part III will propose the use of a licensees committee, similar to the Official Creditors Committee, to oversee the protection of a patent during the pendency of a licensor's bankruptcy proceeding.
I. PATENT LICENSES
Historically, firms have focused on deriving profits from manufacturing plants or investments while neglecting the profit potential of their intellectual property portfolios. 18 Many companies have recently realized, however, that patents are a key to maintaining a competitive advantage in the marketplace. 19 This heightened awareness of intellectual property has resulted in an increased emphasis on protecting patentable technology. 20 Aggressive patenting strategies [f] ailure to prosecute an infringing third party renders the licensed patent worthless, for the very purpose of a patent is to permit patent holders and licensees to prevent unauthorized parties from engaging in the patented activity").
18. See Grindley & Teece, supra note 3, at 8 ("While firms have for decades actively managed their physical and financial assets, until quite recently intellectual property . . . management was a backwater.").
19. See id. 20. See id. at 17 (offering statistics showing that, in the 25-year span from 1969 to 1994, nearly 8% of the patents granted to the top semiconductor companies were issued in 1994).
do not come without a price, however, and companies have turned to patent licensing to recoup these costs. 21 
A. The Decision to License
The role that patents play within the economy depends upon the ability of the patent owner to protect her patent against infringers. 22 In 1982, Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and granted it exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. 23 Since its creation, the CAFC has improved the predictability and enforceability of patents while developing a more coherent body of law. 24 Importantly, CAFC decisions have helped overcome earlier judicial bias against patents as evil monopolies. 25 Following the precedents of the CAFC, district courts have increasingly upheld the validity of patents. 26 Growing confidence that patents would survive judicial scrutiny prompted more businesses to rely on their intellectual property as core business assets. 27 Focusing their creative energies on their patent portfolios, businesses realized that they could exploit them in a variety of ways: by practicing 28 the patented invention themselves (vertical integration), by selling the patented invention to another (assignment), or by allowing another to practice the invention (licensing).
29
Among the various ways to exploit an invention, vertical integration and assignment lie at opposites ends of the spectrum. The patent statute grants the patentee "the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States." 30 A patentee is considered to have "vertically integrated" her patent if she not only develops the patented invention but also exploits it in the marketplace. 31 Thus, the vertically integrated patentee makes, uses, offers for sale and sells the patented invention. Vertical integration makes sense if the patentee can produce and market the invention at least as effectively as anyone else could.
32
At the other end of the spectrum, a patentee may use an assignment to transfer all of her interest in the patent, including the right to exclude others, to a third party. 33 A patentee who does not want to vertically integrate, but wants to retain rights to the patent can opt for an intermediate solution, the patent license. Rather than transfer the U. L. REV. 1087, 1090-91 (1988) (noting that, since the creation of the CAFC, patent litigants face an increased likelihood that a court will find the patent at issue to be valid).
27. See DRAFTING LICENSE AGREEMENTS, supra note 25, § 6.04, at 6-8 (stating that "the decisions of the Federal Circuit on validity and infringement and its economic orientation to patent issues are leading to increased licensing activity").
28. In the context of this Note, the term "practice" encompasses the terms "make," "use," "offer for sale," and "sell."
29. See JOHN W. SCHLICHER, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LEGAL, BUSINESS, AND MARKET DYNAMICS 23, 164-65 (1996) .
30. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (1994 33. Section 261 of the patent statute governs a patentee's right to assign her patent. It reads in pertinent part:
Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the whole or any specified part of the United States. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1994) . An assignment is defined as "[t]he act of transferring to another all or part of one's property, interest or rights." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (6th ed. 1990).
right to exclude others, the license merely acts as a promise by the patentee not to sue the licensee for practicing the invention. 34 Patent licenses may present good business opportunities for both the patentee-licensor as well as the licensee by allowing both parties to procure something that they cannot furnish efficiently on their own. Patentees-licensors might use patent licenses to obtain much needed manufacturing and marketing services, 35 to break into foreign markets, 36 or to enter domestic markets without making large capital investments. 37 As illustrated by the battle for market dominance between Apple and IBM, patent licenses may also create a larger demand for the patentee's invention and in some cases guarantee that her invention becomes the technical standard in the industry.
38 From a licensee's perspective, a patent license can allow him to penetrate a new market without the expense and risk associated with a massive research and development effort. 39 After deciding that it makes good business sense to license patented technology, the parties must decide what type of license will help them to achieve their goals efficiently. TECHNOLOGY LICENSING 3 (1996) (noting that licenses are a good way for domestic companies to break into international markets by licensing to entities that already possess an expertise in the particular foreign market).
37. See id. (stating that licensees can allow a company to enter a market "without having to make a heavy investment in capital equipment and personnel" and thus to "avoid [] many of the risks" of developing a new product).
38. Unlike Apple, who refused to license their technology, IBM adopted a broad licensing strategy for its personal computers. See id. at 3-4. Though Bill Gates may disagree, at least one commentator suspects that IBM's licensing strategy may be largely responsible for the wide acceptance of the PC in the marketplace compared with Apple's lagging Macintosh sales. See id.; see also Meyer, supra note 2, at 43 (stating that in certain segments of the high technology industry "patent licenses are often provided on a free or nominal-payment basis in order to promulgate the patented technology as a de facto industry standard").
39. See BATTERSBY & GRIMES, supra note 36, at 5; see also SULLIVAN, supra note 35, at 92 (noting that licensing of technology allows a company to channel existing resources towards the "developmental aspects of the product or planning for the next generation of products").
B. Exclusive and Nonexclusive Patent Licenses
The parties can choose one of two general types of patent license relationships, exclusive or nonexclusive. Under an exclusive patent license, the patentee promises to continue to exclude all others from practicing the invention. 40 Thus, an exclusive patent license involves two promises by the patentee: not to sue the licensee for infringement and not to make that same promise to anyone else. Under a nonexclusive patent license, the patentee only promises not to sue the licensee for infringement. 41 Whether to pursue an exclusive or a nonexclusive relationship is a complex decision that determines how much control each party will have over the patented technology. An exclusive relationship necessarily involves a large shift in control over the patent from the patentee to the licensee. This shift in control may benefit the patentee by maximizing his royalty rate, 42 43. An exclusive license may induce licensee investment by ensuring that the investment will not benefit other licensees. See SCHLICHER, supra note 29, at 70-71. Without an exclusive license, the licensee may be unwilling to invest in a variety of otherwise profitable activities like research and development, marketing, and customer services. See id. at 69-70 (noting that research and development investments in nonexclusively licensed technologies may yield unprotectible improvements that can be used by other licensees, that marketing investments may increase market demand for all licensees, and that investment in customer services like repair services may be used by customers of other licensees).
44. Economies of scale exist when it is cheaper, per unit, to produce a large quantity of a particular item than it is to produce a small quantity. See DAVID N. HYMAN, ECONOMICS 252-55 (2d instructor's ed. 1992). Thus, when economies of scale exist, an exclusive licensee may be able to minimize production costs because he will be responsible for producing a large quantity of goods-enough to meet the entire market demand. These lower costs will increase the profitability of the licensee's exploitation of the patent, see id., and should make the exclusive licensee more willing to pay a higher royalty to the licensor-patentee than he would have paid for a nonexclusive license.
From the licensee's perspective, an exclusive license may provide a dominant market position 45 as well as the ability to control the exploitation and protection of the invention. 46 The benefits of an exclusive relationship do not come without costs, however. An exclusive license forces the patentee-licensor to "plac[e] all [of his] eggs in one basket," 47 which may not be a good idea for several reasons. Even though the exclusive licensee has the affirmative duty to maximize the use of the invention, 48 he may fail to exploit the invention, in which case the patentee has no other licensees available to generate income. 49 The patentee also loses the ability to use his invention for his own purposes. 50 Granting an exclusive license may also subject the patentee to increased antitrust exposure. 51 Finally, an exclusive rela-45. See Kleinginna & Shanda, supra note 42, at 1502 (noting that by obtaining an exclusive license, the licensee has the "opportunity to optimize the end-market products' pricing cycle" and, as a result, "possibly control the market, in lieu of being controlled by [it]").
46. See Frost, supra note 3, at 734.665 (discouraging licensors from issuing exclusive licenses because it is "important to have the product available on a nonexclusive basis to the industry in general"). If a license is nonexclusive, the licensee is not able to control how other nonexclusive licensees exploit the invention. Additionally, a licensee is not able to sue infringers to protect the invention. , at 3-31 ("Exclusive licenses of patents . . . may be subject to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976."). The Act requires exclusive intellectual property licenses to be reported if (1) either party is engaged in activities that affect United States commerce, (2) one party has total assets tionship allows the licensee to sue for patent infringement, which can force the patentee to litigate in inconvenient fora. 52 At least one commentator has indicated that the loss of control over infringement litigation that accompanies an exclusive license may drive the decision to pursue a nonexclusive relationship. 53 In the end, most patentees conclude that the costs and loss of control over the technology associated with exclusive licenses outweigh the benefits and opt for a nonexclusive relationship. 54 To fully understand how a nonexclusive licensee can be adversely affected by his licensor's bankruptcy and subsequent rejection of the patent license, it is necessary to examine why courts deny nonexclusive patent licensees standing to sue for patent infringement.
C. Nonexclusive Licensees Lack Standing to Sue for Patent Infringement
Since standing to sue for patent infringement is a statutory right, understanding nonexclusive licensee standing requires an examination of the patent statute. Under the statute, a patentee has standing to bring an action for patent infringement. 55 The term "patentee" includes assignees of the patent. 56 While the patent statute appears to or annual net sales of $100 million or more and the other party has total assets or annual net sales of $10 million or more, and (3) 
George Frost noted that:
The exclusive licensee can be expected to want to enforce the patent against his competitors. If it were possible for him to do this without involving us we would not be concerned. But this is not possible and any such enforcement is most likely to become litigation involving GM. It would take far greater royalty potential than is usually available to warrant the risk of being dragged into litigation.
Frost, supra note 3, at 734.665. 54. See Meyer, supra note 2, at 34. 55. See 35 U.S.C. § 281 (1994) ("A patentee shall have remedy by civil action for infringement of his patent.").
56. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(d) (1994) (stating that the term patentee "includes not only the patentee to whom the patent was issued but also the successors in title to the patentee"). Courts grant standing to sue for patent infringement only to patentees and their assignees, courts have interpreted the statute to grant standing to anyone who possesses any of the proprietary rights granted by the patent statute. 57 These rights consist of the ability "to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the [patented] invention throughout the United States."
58 Thus, the standing doctrine may be stated as follows: anyone who possesses the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling a patented invention has standing to sue for infringement of that patent.
Applying this doctrine, courts have held that exclusive patent licensees have standing to sue for infringement provided that they join the patentee to the action and hold some property rights under the patent.
59 While this appears to open patent standing to a broad class of potential plaintiffs, courts have limited this effect by requiring the language in the license to state clearly and unambiguously that the license is exclusive. 60 As a result, many licenses which on their face appear to be exclusive may be held to be nonexclusive for standing purposes.
Under merely a promise by the patentee not to sue the licensee for infringement of the patent. 62 The license does not allow the nonexclusive licensee to exclude anyone from using the patented technology. Thus, the patentee has transferred no property interest in the patent to the nonexclusive licensee. Courts have also stated several policy reasons for denying standing to nonexclusive licensees. In A.L. Smith Iron Co. v. Dickson, 63 Judge Learned Hand stated the policy reasons for denying standing as follows:
It is indeed true that a mere licensee may have an interest at stake in such a suit; his license may be worth much more to him than the royalties which he has agreed to pay, and its value will ordinarily depend on his ability to suppress the competition of his rivals. The reason why he is not permitted to sue is not because he has nothing to protect. But against that interest is the interest of the infringer to be immune from a second suit by the owner of the patent; and also the interest of the patent owner to be free to choose his forum . . . . Indeed, the owner may have granted a number of licenses, and it would be exceedingly oppressive to subject him to the will of all his licensees. These two interests in combination have been held to overweigh any interest of the licensee . . . . 64 Thus, courts deny standing to nonexclusive patent licensees because (1) standing requires a property interest that nonexclusive licensees lack, (2) standing would subject infringers to multiple liability, and (3) standing would deprive the patent owner of the ability to choose his own forum for the infringement action.
Since patents, and hence patent licenses, derive their value from the ability to exclude others from utilizing the technology, 65 he trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."); see also HARVEY M. LEBOWITZ, BANKRUPTCY DESKBOOK 436 (1986). The trustee referred to in the statute is the bankruptcy trustee who is appointed by the court to perform four basic duties: investigate, liquidate, litigate, and administrate the bankruptcy case. See BUCHBINDER, supra note 73, at 106-07. For the chapter 11 reorganization cases that are the focus of this Note, the debtor typically acts as his own bankruptcy trustee and is referred to as the "debtor-in-possession." See id. at "under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." 77 A debtor will assume an executory contract, allowing it to remain in effect according to its original terms, if performance of the contract would benefit his rehabilitation. 78 Conversely, a debtor will reject an executory contract if he believes that continued performance under the contract would be detrimental to his rehabilitation.
79
While the right to reject promotes debtor rehabilitation, rejection can have a highly detrimental effect on the other party to the contract. The Code attempts to protect the interest of the nondebtor party by allowing him to enter a general unsecured claim for breach of contract against the debtor.
80 Since general unsecured creditors are 108. Throughout this Note, the terms "debtor" and "debtor-in-possession" will be used interchangeably. 83 allowed the debtor-licensor, Richmond Metal Finishers, to reject as executory its nonexclusive patent license agreement with its licensee, Lubrizol Enterprises. 84 The court realized that its holding could have "a general chilling effect upon the willingness of such parties" to enter into intellectual property licenses, but stated that it felt bound by the Bankruptcy Code to allow the rejection without concern for the detrimental effects to the nondebtor party. 85 The court noted that Congress had enacted provisions that allowed courts to consider the plight of real property lessees, who also possess unique property, but that "no comparable special treatment is provided for technology licensees such as Lubrizol."
86 In response to the Lubrizol decision, Congress enacted the IPBPA, which attempted to balance the competing policies of debtor rehabilitation and innovation advancement. 87 ceeding itself are paid before unsecured tax claims). General unsecured creditors typically will be paid last. (1994) ). Section 365(n) reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
(n)(1) If the trustee rejects an executory contract under which the debtor is a licensor of a right to intellectual property, the licensee under such contract may elect-(A) to treat such contract as terminated by such rejection if such rejection by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would entitle the licensee to treat such contract as terminated by virtue of its own terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or an agreement made by the licensee with another entity; or (B) to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity provision of such contract, but excluding any other right under applicable nonbankruptcy law to specific performance of such contract) under such contract, and under any agreement supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual property (including any embodiment of such intellectual property to the extent protected by applicable nonbankruptcy law), as such rights existed immediately before the case commenced, for-(i) the duration of such contract; and (ii) any period for which such contract may be extended by the licensee as of right under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
(2) If the licensee elects to retain its rights, as described in paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection, under such contract-(A) the trustee shall allow the licensee to exercise such rights; (B) the licensee shall make all royalty payments due under such contract for the duration of such contract and for any period described in paragraph (1)(B) of this subsection for which the licensee extends such contract; and (C) the licensee shall be deemed to waive-(i) any right to setoff it may have with respect to such contract under this title or applicable nonbankruptcy law; and (ii) any claim allowable under section 503(b) of this title arising from the performance of such contract.
11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (1994 97. If the licensee chooses to retain his right to use the intellectual property, the debtorlicensor must allow the licensee to exercise these rights and, in return, the licensee must make all royalty payments due under the license. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2) . Section 365(n)(2) also states that the licensee waives any right to setoff and administrative expenses. See id. Generally, administrative expenses include all expenses incurred by the estate after the commencement of a bankruptcy. See BUCHBINDER, supra note 73, at 234. These expenses may include attorneys' or other professionals' fees. See id. "Setoff" is "the common law right of a creditor to balance mutual debts with a debtor." Id. at 189. This common law right is codified in § 553 of the Bankruptcy Code, with certain limitations. See id. The right of setoff may be beneficial to the creditor by allowing him to have a priority interest in the money owed to him. See BAIRD, supra note 74, at 211. However, the limitations imposed by the Bankruptcy Code can lessen the amount actually received by the creditor, thus most creditors do not request permission to pursue a setoff. See BUCHBINDER, supra note 73, at 189-90 (stating that the Code does not allow a creditor to use as a setoff either "a claim assigned to it by another entity within 90 days of the lectual property held by the debtor, 98 and trustee actions between petition filing date and the rejection date. 99 While the IPBPA has had its supporters, 100 there has been extensive criticism of the Act.
B. Criticism of the IPBPA
1. Questioning the Need for Congressional Action. Before examining the specific features of the IPBPA, one must first consider the threshold issue of whether congressional action was, in fact, needed to protect intellectual property licensees in the event of licensor bankruptcy. Some critics believe that Congress overreacted to the result in Lubrizol by enacting the IPBPA. 101 They believe that the threat from the Lubrizol holding was uncertain and that courts would have, in time, adopted a balancing test. 102 This test, which had already bankruptcy filing" or "a debt owed to the debtor and incurred within 90 days prior to the filing"). 101. See House Hearings, supra note 10, at 103 (testimony of George A. Hahn, on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference) (noting that a judicial balancing test would have been preferable to a congressional response); Moy, supra note 94, at 192 (concluding that a judicial balancing test would have been more effective than legislative interference in alleviating the problems created by Lubrizol).
102. See House Hearings, supra note 10, at 100 (testimony of George A. Hahn, on behalf of the National Bankruptcy Conference) (stating that since courts ultimately will adopt a balancing test, Congress should allow courts to correct the problem); Moy, supra note 94, at 178 (noting that "[g]iven time, the balancing test would have most likely settled the problems that persisted in cases involving the rejection of . . . technology licensing agreements").
been applied by several courts, relied on the bankruptcy court's equitable powers to balance the effects on the debtor's rehabilitation against the effects on the licensee's business to determine if the debtor could reject the license. 103 These critics argue that allowing judicial resolution of the issue would have resulted in a flexible rule that might have treated parties more fairly in individual cases than does subjecting them to a rigid statutory rule that most likely does not address every potential circumstance.
104
While the use of a balancing approach appears to be more fair in individual cases, it does not provide the predictability that is critical to contracting parties. It is often better to have a less-than-fair rule that is predictable than to have a completely fair rule that is unpredictable. 105 Parties value predictability over fairness because they can plan their affairs based on less-than-fair, predictable rules, but not based on completely fair, unpredictable rules. 106 In the case of intellectual property licenses, the balancing approach might be more fair, but it would inhibit intellectual property licensing. Since the ability to reject a license would be determined by balancing the equities, the potential licensor would not be able to predict whether or not he would be able to reject the license in the event of his bankruptcy. Likewise, prior to licensor bankruptcy, the potential licensee would be unable to predict whether or not he could retain the license. This lack of predictability inherent in a balancing test would inhibit intel- 105. See Ducre v. Executive Officers of Halter Marine, Inc., 752 F.2d 976, 994 n.37 (5th Cir. 1985) (noting "the supremely important interests in predictability and certainty which lie at the heart of contract law"); Breskman v. BCB, Inc., 708 F. Supp. 655, 657 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result . . . are of greatest importance when the parties are likely to take into consideration the legal consequences of their planned transactions, such as the legal effect of contracts").
106. See 6A WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 152:16, at 152-39 (2d ed. 1997) (noting that predictability is important because "[i]f business people do not know whether their contracts will be enforced, they will not engage in commerce").
lectual property licenses and continue the chilling effect brought about by the Lubrizol decision. Moreover, even assuming that the balancing approach did alleviate the chilling effect, judicial development advocates admit that it could have taken several years for this balancing test to develop organically, 107 during which time the chilling effect of Lubrizol would continue. While it is likely that the IPBPA does not provide answers for all intellectual property dilemmas faced in the event of licensor bankruptcy, some legislative action was called for to provide the predictability that could not have been achieved through the judicial development of a balancing test.
2.
Criticism of IPBPA Provisions. Congress realized that "intellectual property licensing arrangements are not generally standardized" and that "the particular transaction is the product of the circumstances of the licensor, the licensee and other interested parties."
108 Despite this realization, the IPBPA sets out fairly simple rules to alter the complex relationship between licensor and licensee. While congressional action was sought by critics of the Lubrizol decision, 109 and arguably by the Lubrizol court itself, 110 perhaps no congressional action could have solved all of the myriad problems presented by the bankrupt licensor's rejection of an intellectual property license. 111 Critics of the IPBPA have faulted the Act for its limited It is difficult to construct a Code provision broad enough to cover typical problems, yet one that will be fair and equitable under all circumstances.").
scope, 112 for failing to protect the licensor in the event of licensee's bankruptcy, 113 for failing to adopt a balancing-of-equities approach, 114 and for failing to limit the licensor's ability to assign the license.
115
Much of the criticism, however, has focused on the ability of the licensor to reject his affirmative obligations. Criticism of the debtor-licensor's ability to reject affirmative obligations has focused on two common obligations: the obligation to provide ongoing technical support 116 [w]eapon"). Chertok argues that assignment is the licensor's ultimate weapon because the licensor may assign the license to someone who is incapable of adequately performing under the contract. See id. at 1075. There are two flaws in this argument. First, if the licensor chooses to reject the license rather than assume and assign, the licensee is guaranteed of not receiving adequate performance, since by rejecting, the licensor avoids all affirmative duties. Therefore, the licensee is no worse off than if the assignee failed to adequately perform. Second, if the assignee fails adequately to perform under the terms of the license, the licensee can sue the assignee for breach of contract, and actually hope to collect, assuming that the assignee is not also in bankruptcy. Therefore, assumption and assignment may actually put the licensee in a better position than rejection. See also David S. Kupetz, Intellectual Property Issues in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Reorganization Cases, 35 IDEA 383, 397 (1995) (noting that § 365(n) is silent as to the assignment issue and recommending that parties include clauses in the license agreement limiting the right of assignment to indicate their intent in the event of a bankruptcy).
116. See Brown et al., supra note 111, at 195-96 (noting the inequity of IPBPA's forcing a licensee to continue making all royalty payments while a licensor is allowed to reject ture improvements. 117 Critics argue that a licensee's interest in intellectual property extends beyond the mere right to use it without the threat of an infringement suit. 118 They contend that allowing the licensor to reject these affirmative obligations diminishes the value of the intellectual property.
119 While critics of the IPBPA have noted that provisions of the Act may have tipped the scales in favor of either the licensee or the patentee-licensor, they have all but ignored the fact that it does not address licensee standing. This aspect of the Act could nullify any impact its enactment may have had.
"obligations to train the licensee's personnel, to modify the technology according to changes in the licensee's business, and otherwise to support the licensee and service the technology"); John J. , nor was it mentioned in the Senate Report." Id. He then posits that there is a "competing policy" of allowing the debtor-licensor only to reject affirmative obligations. Id. at 818. He argues that given the silence regarding the "fresh start" policy, Congress must have intended to promote the policy of affirmative obligation avoidance rather than the policy of debtor rehabilitation. Id. at 816-19. Canavan concludes that since the right to future improvements is not, technically, an affirmative obligation, the IPBPA does not allow the debtorlicensor to withhold these improvements from the licensee. See id. at 830-31. Canavan's fatal flaw is his myopic focus on the IPBPA. The "classic" bankruptcy policy of debtor rehabilitation was not mentioned in connection with passage of the IPBPA because the IPBPA is merely a small section in an entire code devoted to debtor rehabilitation. Additionally, the licensor's right to reject affirmative obligations is not a "competing" policy; rather it furthers the overriding policy of debtor rehabilitation.
118. See, e.g., Fry, supra note 116, at 642 (noting that technical consulting services provided by the licensor "are largely inseparable from the technology which is the subject of the license agreement"). 
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C. IPBPA's Failure to Address Licensee Standing Is Its Biggest Flaw
Patents are valuable because they prevent unauthorized parties from practicing certain technology. 120 Thus, the inability to bring an infringement action makes the patent worthless. 121 In criticizing the IPBPA, commentators have addressed this problem in passing by discussing how a licensee might be reimbursed if forced to defend the intellectual property, 122 but that discussion bypasses the true issue: the debtor-licensor's ability to reject the duty to prosecute infringers coupled with the nonexclusive licensee's lack of standing to bring an infringement action renders the nonexclusive patent license worthless to the nonexclusive licensee. 123 Under nonbankruptcy conditions, the nonexclusive licensee does not need the ability to sue for patent infringement. Even though he may base his entire business on the license, the nonexclusive licensee can protect himself by contractually requiring the patentee-licensor to defend the patent against infringement. 124 The nonexclusive licensee has a cause of action for breach of contract should the licensor fail to prosecute infringers. 125 However, if the licensor files for bankruptcy and rejects the nonexclusive patent license as an executory contract, the nonexclusive licensee is no longer protected. By rejecting the license, the debtor-licensor rejects all affirmative duties under the license, including the duty to defend the patent against infringement. 126 As in the nonbankruptcy setting, the nonexclusive licensee has a cause of action for breach of contract. 127 This cause of action is of little value to the licensee, however, because it becomes a general unsecured claim against the debtor-licensor's bankruptcy estate. 128 General unsecured claims are the last claims to be paid and may be worth pennies on the dollar at the end of an oftentimes lengthy case. 129 In the meantime, the licensee's business may be decimated by ongoing infringement. Because nonexclusive licensees must have standing to sue for patent infringement to protect themselves in this situation, Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code to allow nonexclusive licensees to sue for patent infringement if the debtorlicensor rejects the license.
IV. USE OF THE COMMITTEE MECHANISM TO PROTECT THE PATENT
The IPBPA was enacted to ensure that the debtor-licensor cannot unilaterally cut off an intellectual property licensee's right to use the intellectual property. 130 For the IPBPA to fulfill its purpose, a nonexclusive patent licensee must be able to protect the underlying patent against infringers following a debtor-licensor's rejection of the nonexclusive patent license. To provide this protection, nonexclusive patent licensees must be given standing to sue for patent infringement in this limited situation. Thus, what is needed is a mechanism under the Bankruptcy Code whereby a group of similarly situated parties can sue in the name of the debtor to protect property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Such a mechanism, called the creditors' committee, already exists under the Bankruptcy Code. This Part will examine how the creditors' committee can be used to provide standing to nonexclusive patent licensees.
A. The Committee Mechanism
The Bankruptcy Code uses committees to protect the interests of creditors while promoting debtor rehabilitation. 131 Section 1102 calls for the mandatory appointment of a committee composed of unsecured creditors, commonly referred to as the Official Creditors' Committee. 132 The creditors' committee ordinarily consists of the seven largest unsecured creditors who are representative of the body of unsecured creditors. 133 Additionally, the United States trustee may appoint other committees at her discretion or, upon request of one of the parties in interest, by order of the court. 134 Congress intended for additional committees to be appointed in large bankruptcy cases where the class of unsecured creditors consists of a large number of creditors with a wide variety of interests and objectives. 135 While additional committees have been used to protect special interests of groups such as equity shareholders, trade creditors, secured creditors, and current and former employees, 136 bankruptcy courts have been reluctant to order the appointment of additional committees of unsecured creditors. 137 This reluctance stems from the belief that multiple committees may complicate negotiations between the debtor and creditors, delay the debtor's reorganization process, and create additional administrative expenses for the debtor's estate. 138 To aid committees in protecting the interests of creditors, the Code grants them broad powers. Committees have the power to monitor the actions or inaction of the debtor, 139 to aid in formulating a plan of reorganization, 140 and to "perform such other services as are in the interest of those represented."
141 Additionally, with the court's approval, committees may hire their own attorneys and accountants, 142 whose expenses are payable by the debtor's estate. 143 Commit-tees also have a general right to "raise and [to] appear and be heard on any issue in a case under [chapter 11]." 144 While the Code grants broad powers to committees, it does not expressly grant committees the power to bring adversary proceedings in the name of the debtor. 145 Realizing that standing provides an important form of creditor protection, 146 however, a majority of courts consider committee standing to sue on behalf of the debtor to be implicitly included among the broad general powers granted to committees. 147 Courts have limited their willingness to grant committee standing to avoid unnecessarily wresting power from the debtor. Before granting standing to sue on the debtor's behalf, courts typically require the creditors' committee to show that "(1) a colorable claim exists that the debtor has not pursued, (2) the committee made a demand upon the debtor to bring the action, and (3) the debtor unjustifiably refused to pursue the action following the demand." 148 To protect the debtor's right to administer his bankruptcy estate, the creditors' committee must demonstrate these elements even if the committee members fully fund the litigation. 149 While courts usually grant standing to allow creditors' committees to pursue debtor claims arising under the bankruptcy statute, 150 courts also have granted standing to committees so that they may pursue debtor claims arising under other statutes. Louisiana World Exposition v. Federal Insurance Co. 151 involved a contractor creditors' committee, appointed by a bankruptcy court under 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a), that had filed a complaint under Louisiana law against the officers and directors of the debtor, Louisiana World Exposition, for gross negligence, mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty. 152 A bankruptcy court had granted standing to the contractor creditors' committee to sue on behalf and in the name of the debtor. 153 The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, noting that under Louisiana law, corporate creditors do not have standing to maintain such an action; therefore, the creditors' committee should not have standing. 154 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that under the state statute only a corporation or its shareholders had a cause of action and that a creditor has no such cause of action. 155 In spite of this fact, the court held that the contractor creditors' committee had standing to bring the suit against the directors because the committee was bringing the action on behalf of and in the name of the debtor, who did have standing to sue under the state statute. 156 The contractors in Louisiana World Exposition and nonexclusive patent licensees are in similar situations. The members of the contractor creditors' committee ordinarily would have lacked standing to sue for gross negligence, mismanagement, and breach of fiduciary duty.
mechanism solves the problem of multiple liability because it would effectively create a mandatory class action comprised of all interested potential plaintiffs to prosecute the infringement action. Since the licensees' committee would be pursuing the infringement action on behalf of the patentee, the patentee would be bound by the outcome of the case. Similarly, all other licensees would be bound by the outcome based on their membership on the committee and their opportunity to assist in pursuing the action.
Finally, use of the committee mechanism overcomes the criticism that nonexclusive licensee standing hinders the patentee's privilege to choose a convenient forum in two ways. Prior to being granted standing to sue, the licensees' committee must have made a demand on the debtor-patentee to pursue the action which was refused by the debtor-patentee. This safeguard gives the debtorpatentee the opportunity to choose his forum by choosing to pursue the infringement action. If the debtor-patentee refuses the demand, he can be deemed to have waived his privilege to choose his forum. Moreover, once the committee is granted standing, it can bring an action in place of the patentee. By not requiring the committee to join the debtor-patentee in the infringement action, the debtor-patentee is spared litigation in an inconvenient forum.
Use of the committee mechanism would continue § 365(n)'s current policy of relieving the debtor-licensor of the affirmative duty to prosecute infringing parties, thus promoting debtor rehabilitation. The committee mechanism would also allow the patent licensees to protect their interest in the patent without subjecting the infringing party to multiple liability.
CONCLUSION
Currently, § 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code allows debtorlicensors to reject patent licenses as executory contracts and, in the process, to reject the affirmative duty to protect the patent against infringement. As written, the statute allows patent licensees to continue using the license while providing for debtor rehabilitation. However, Congress did not consider that nonexclusive patent licensees do not have standing to sue for patent infringement.
Section 365(n) should be amended to provide for the formation of a patent licensee creditors' committee upon the rejection of a patent license. The committee would balance the interests of the patent licensees with the goal of debtor rehabilitation by providing a
